Under the impact of global economic developments, social pluralisation, and the rise of market ideologies, the shift in policy has been towards ‘de-regulation’ and in the direction of ‘self-government’. Alternatively, we can depict this as more a matter of ‘re-regulation’, with a shift in the ideological balance from notions public interest (open to rational debate in the public sphere) and citizenship, towards those based on discourses of people as consumers and the public as consumer markets.

We shall discuss the nature of regulation, in particular the French ‘regulation school’. Then, we shall examine two concrete cases of how particular modes of regulation affect the nature of cultural goods and services: leisure goods and services, and public service broadcasting.

Antonio Gramsci, a neo-Marxist, proposes that every form of capitalist production requires a complementary form of consumption. The two forms constitute a ‘regime of accumulation’ (e.g. Fordism, post-fordism, neo-liberalism, and Asian Fordism).

The maintenance of a regime of accumulation requires a ‘mode of regulation’, a set of non-economic institutions, such as schools, mass media, welfare state, etc (e.g. Keynesian Welfare State and Schumpeterian Workfare State).

Regulation theorists argue that moral regulation attempts to ‘normalise’ historically and social specific forms of behaviour as universal. Thus, each regime of accumulation has its corresponding cultural forms (e.g. mass culture and individualised culture).

Many theorists argue that the nature of regulation has changed. The development of the modern order has seen a movement from external regulation and constraint to self-regulation and self-discipline (governments encourage individuals to take responsibility for themselves, to develop healthy, enterprising self)

We can ask the following question: To what extent do economic developments seem to have determined the direction taken by cultural regulation in the sphere of leisure in different periods? Whereas, traditional Marxists suggest a simple and one-way causal relationship (the ‘base-superstructure thesis’), we shall discuss a more complicated approach, the neo-Marxist, French regulation school.

To model the connection between economy and culture, we can use the concept of ‘mode of regulation’. According to Ian Henry, the politics of leisure policy in Britain can be seen as falling into six distinct periods since the C18th (see Table 1). Each period is characterised by a typical form of regulation of culture and leisure, bearing a close relationship to the social and economic trends at that time. Henry’s account gives priority to the effect of basic economic and political factors in the history of cultural regulation.

1. 1780-1840: A great fear of working-class revolt and public disorder. The emergence of the industrial revolution meant a sharper distinction between work and leisure time. Regulation of cultural and leisure practices concerned with civilising and disciplining the working-class.
2. 1840-1900: The state fostered the voluntary initiatives of individuals and groups, and public funds were used to capitalise on gifts. Working-class had more disposable income and spare time and this attracted commercial investment.
3. 1900-1939: The growth of direct state involvement in the leisure field. This marks the gradual build-up of a welfare state, which had a duty to provide facilities that were conducive to the health and welfare of its citizens.
4. 1944-1976: Struggles between political and ideological tendencies; for example, the conservationist tendency was concerned to maintain cultural standards and some increased access (‘democratisation of culture’) while critics wanted ‘cultural democracy’ to allow groups to promote their own cultural forms.
5. 1976-1984: Restructuring of the welfare state meant a shift from rights of citizenship and reducing inequalities to that of promoting social order and foster self-reliance, family and community groups.
6. 1985-1990s: Governments used their powers to promote free market pluralism and enterprise, whether through voluntary bodies or commercial organisations.

To sum up, the historical account posits no mechanical relationship between economic base and cultural superstructure; developments in culture cannot be explained as ‘functional requirements’ of changes in the economic system. Though, economic development cannot be completely incompatible with cultural developments.

We can ask the following question: Do the mass media provide the necessary public sphere for undistorted rational communication and debate that are said to be essential in constituting a modern democracy? We shall suggest that the increasing penetration of the market logic into the public sphere has damaged its inherent qualities of political discourse and equality.

For Jurgen Habermas, the ‘public sphere’ represents a community of citizens, coming together as equals in a forum within civil society, forming public opinion through rational debate, and is distinct from the authority of the state and private sphere of the family. Habermas’s idea of the public sphere has been taken up in debates about the future of mass media, and its potentiality for providing a public forum for rational communication and debate. The public sphere suggests the importance of a sphere of social communication that is neither wholly controlled by the state nor concentrated in the hands of corporate organisations.

Defenders of public service television (e.g. BBC in the UK) argue for a distinct and uncommercialised form of broadcasting:

• public service broadcasting has a duty to educate and inform;
• the de-regulation of national public services (e.g. commercial television licenses auctioned to highest bidder, pay-for-view, and satellite broadcasting) is a threat to democratic citizenship, in that it delivers control of our information into the hands of international conglomerates;
• commercial broadcasting leads to the erosion of a ‘quality’ universal service to which everyone has access, and the abandonment of special and minority interest programming that cannot secure the backing of advertisers;
• public service broadcasting protects viewers and listeners from some of their own tastes and desires (such as violence, racism and sexism) that might not be in the public interest.

However, advocates of public service broadcasting have been criticised for imposing an elite high culture on a diverse, plural, multi-cultural national community, excluding the voices of minority interests, such as women, ethnic community, and gays and lesbians.

Critics (in particular ‘the New Right’) criticise public service broadcasting, and argue for de-regulated and commercialised broadcasting because:

• state-organised public broadcasting has high costs;
• state broadcasting prevents the free flow of information by restricting advertising;
• public service broadcasting restricts consumer choice;
• the market responds to the actual preferences of ‘the public’.

However, in practice, the free market is unable to provide services for a diversity of social groups, especially the low-income and disadvantaged groups.

In practice, de-regulation of media has meant the predominance of culture of entertainment values, (i.e. spectacles, public dramas, talk shows), and consumer choice that is socially conservative. In effect, it inhibits serious thinking, evaluation of values, induces moral panics, and leaves the status quo unchanged. Media for political participation in mass democracy means a rejection of the (post-modernists’) depiction of media as a spectacle.