Data is not collected, but produced. Theoretical frameworks and interests mediate our observations. Indeed, social theory is of crucial importance as it enables us to interpret the empirical, to inform on political, economic and social issues, and to provide critical reflection on the research process itself. In light of this, we shall discuss the relationship between social theory and social research.

There is a two-way relationship between theory and research. Social theory informs our understanding of issues, which, in turn, assists us in making research decisions and making sense of the world. The experience of doing research and its findings also influences our theorising.

Inevitably, a theory will be abstract, as it gives a selective and one-sided account of the many-sided concrete social world. Such a theory allows researchers to make links between the abstract and the concrete, the theoretical and the empirical, thought statements and observational statements, the intransitive objects and the transitive objects. In other words, the language of observation is distinct from the language of theory. To be sure, the theory need not only be valued for its empirical validity and logical coherence, but also for its ability to generate insights and issues (e.g. homophobia and nationalism) that are overlooked in the political and academic worlds, and to provide a research agenda (e.g., multi-culturalism and post-colonialism) neglected by existing schools of thought.

However, criticisms are made that theoretical considerations appear to be far removed and detached from the everyday concerns of the social world, and too general and limiting in their perspectives. Indeed, grand theories (e.g., Marxism and liberalism) are disparaged for their inability to grasp historical and social specific problems.

An alternative approach, found for example in interpretivism, is to ground social theories and abstractions on our everyday observations. Here, as researchers, we seek to render the attachment between theory and data as close as possible. Here, it is suggested that facts speak for themselves, and can generate theoretical propositions. However, this approach fails to acknowledge the theory-laden aspects of observations, so that collecting data is already fraught with assumptions, abstractions, ideas and concepts; we do not neutrally observe the social world. Furthermore, theory ought to be detached from everyday courses, so as to connect the present with the past and the future.

To re-cap, social research needs social theory for its speculative insights and abstractions, and social theory needs research for its practical adequacy. A degree of detachment is both inevitable and desirable; we can dispute the appropriateness of the particular detachment, but not detachment itself.

We can consider three strategies employed to connect the abstract with the concrete.

First, induction is based on the belief that we can proceed from a collection of facts concerning social life (e.g., social class and health), and then make links between these to arrive at our theories. This research process suggests that facts can speak for themselves, and are distinct from the researchers’ interpretations.

However, as already noted, investigators are not neutral. They are influenced by:

• particular vested interests – e.g., funding agencies that commission the research;
• personal interests – e.g., supporting political and social causes such as better distribution of wealth and income; and
• theoretical frameworks and pre-understandings – e.g., liberal and market values.

Second, deduction makes a distinction between the language of observation and the language of theory. Data collection is driven by theoretical interests, and the propositions are constructed such that can be falsified by facts. The propositions remain conjectures until they are refuted by experience.

However, there are some weaknesses. First, if the empirical evidence falsifies the theory, is this sufficient reason to reject it? Maybe the evidence was exceptional, and testing procedures flawed. Second, theorists are unlikely to reject the falsified theory until they discover a new theory that would explain the data. Third, researchers’ observations are not neutral, but already theory-laden and informed by pre-conceptions and values.

Third, retroduction refers to the process of building models of causal mechanisms, powers and structures (e.g., racism, sexism, professionalism and legality) that generate empirical phenomena (employment practices of university departments). This requires the construction of the model, which if it were to exist and act in the postulated way would account for the phenomena in question. The reality of the postulated explanation must then, of course, be subjected to empirical scrutiny.

The basis of retroduction lies within what is taken to be the stratified nature of reality as divided into the real, actual and empirical. The former is taken to be the realm of objects, along with their structures and powers (e.g., class relations, patriarchy, racism, and so on). The realm of the actual refers to what occurs (e.g., strikes, domestic violence, discrimination, etc.) when these powers are activated. The empirical is the domain of experience (e.g., perceptions, awareness and senses of the events). Retroduction, as a strategy, has ontological depth, whereas induction possesses a weak and flat ontological conception of the social world, operating at the level of the empirical.

Kuhn argued that science does not progress according to the criteria of falsifying theories as explained above. He explained that even though theories were falsified and refuted, they remained subject to continuous research, as the theories are never completely falsified because there will always be evidence that both supports and refutes them. Theories form into scientific paradigms (e.g., in the natural sciences, Newtonian and Einsteinium physics; and in the social sciences, Marxian and liberal economics) that do not provide rules for research methods that must slavishly be followed, but rather provide examples of good practices (e.g., scientists shared assumptions, concepts and theories as well as agreement on research questions and techniques).

It is claimed that science develops according to the culture that scientists inhabit, and this determines their practices and choice of theories. If an example of counter-evidence is found to falsify a theory, then it will be the competence of the individual researcher that is called into question, not the theory. Scientists do not attempt to falsify a theory as such, instead they attempt to extend and exploit it in a variety of ways (e.g., different social contexts). Here, science is a conservative endeavour that is only challenged by ‘scientific revolutions’, when, for example, younger scientists enter the field and bring with them a new set of ideas and problems. At this point, a new paradigm replaces the old.

Several implications follow from this understanding of theory and research as more inter-subjective, and shared construction of the social world; i.e., influenced by extra-scientific factors. First, academic disciplines (such as sociology and politics) are characterised not be one single paradigm, but several, reflecting divisions with regard to aims and methods of research, which in turn, reflect deep divisions in society. Second, all sciences are affected by internal values (e.g., the pursuit of truth and objectivity, rational discourse, honest and integrity, etc.) and external values (interests of the sponsors of the research, political and economic pressure groups, etc.). Third, paradigms are not closed systems of thought, instead there is a constant process of comparing one paradigm with another, and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses.

There are two issues concerning how social theory and research relate to social life. First, research involves the interpretation of social settings, events and processes by taking into account of the meanings that people have already given to those settings or processes. In this sense, a researcher gives a second-order interpretation to social actors’ first-order interpretations. In this way, our understandings become a precondition of the production of research; understanding and interpreting social life are necessary not a hindrance to social research and the formation of social theory.

Second, the results and practices of social research feed back into social life; people engage in the interpretation of its findings – double hermeneutics. Consequently, social theory must take into account people’s everyday understandings. There is a constant slippage between the language which we use as researchers to understand and explain social life, and the meanings which people already employ to get on with the business of everyday life. In other words, people’s interpretations of social concepts, assumptions and models will affect their behaviour, to which the researcher has to be sensitive to.

Given the above, there are various ways in which a theory of social life takes into account people’s experiences and understandings in everyday life.

Standpoint feminism regards experiences as a starting point for research. Theory is required to situate the experiences of women within the wider context, and the production of knowledge is regarded as a social, political activity. Theorising about and research of social life must take place within a democratic and participatory situation, otherwise both the theory and the research will reproduce the oppression and discrimination inherent within society.

Critical theory also challenges the proposition of the neutrality of fact-gathering. One of its aims is for the research to feed back into social life in ways that tackle false consciousness and bourgeois ideology. Social theory is not necessarily assessed in terms of ability to discover social facts as such, rather its ability to reveal the relations of domination that exist in society. Critical theorists also claim to know the ‘wishes’ and struggles of the people regardless of whether the people are conscious of them or not.

Interpretivism focuses on people’s subjective experiences, on how people ‘make up’ the social world by sharing meanings, and how they ‘get on’ with each other. For some interpretivists, the theoretical constructs of research should simply reflect the same everyday constructs (i.e., terms and definitions) that people use to interpret social life. The topic of investigation becomes the common-sense methods that people employ in interpreting and interacting within their social environment. For another group of interpretivists, all social interactions should be treated as skilled performance by people, and the topic of inquiry is the way (e.g., language and social rules) in which people view society and render it comprehensible to each other.

The basis of theory has been examined in several ways:

• in terms of its needing to be based solely in facts (inductivism);
• by its being subject to empirical falsification (deductivism);
• by its discovering causal mechanisms to produce empirical effects (retroduction);
• by its reflecting dominant trends of the discipline (Kuhn’s paradigms);
• by its ability to diagnose and inform change (feminism and critical theory); and
• by being grounded in the same constructs as social actors use to interpret their social world in everyday life (interpretivism).

To be sure, researchers need to guard themselves against the idea that they can reflect social reality by producing data without theory (i.e., researchers have no presuppositions, biases and values in their research), and the idea that theory without data can represent reality (i.e., researchers only have biases and standpoints that cannot be objectively evaluated). The former leads to complacency, the latter relativism. By recognising the inevitable relationship between theory and data, it is hoped that researchers become reflexive in their research practices.