Citizenship involves being a legitimate member of the state, having duties to the state and enjoying state protection of their rights. Citizenship also provides the legal framework for associations within civil society. Citizenship is not only a legal status, but has economic repercussions and consequences.

Marshall outlined how citizens possessed three kinds of rights:

• basic, civil rights: e.g., freedom of speech, free to own property, freedom to worship and equality of justice for all;
• political rights: e.g., right to vote and to stand for office; and
• social rights: e.g., social protection against poverty and for education and housing.

Yet, how can the inequality of capitalist civil society be reconciled with ethos of equality associated with citizenship of the state? In other words, capitalism generates real inequalities between the social classes and social groups, and how can this be squared with being formally equal as citizens?

Marx recognised that there was a contradictory relationship between the abstract equality of the state and the concrete inequality of civil society. He argued that the state reflects the class divisions of civil society – the state as an instrument of the ruling class. While, Marx welcomed the expansion of voting rights, only a revolutionary change could bring about real equality. Marx noted that while there was democracy in the political sphere, this was not extended to the factory or office life.

Though, Marshall argued that the emergence of social rights modified the impact of inequalities in civil society. The development of the welfare state post-1945 brought to many people widespread social security, public health and public education.

However, the rise of neo-liberalism in 1970s heralded the ‘rolling back’ of the frontiers of the welfare state. Advocates of neo-liberalism argued that extensive social rights inhibited the development of capitalism, and hindered the entrepreneurial spirit in the civil society. In addition, social rights created a ‘dependency culture’, destroying individual self-reliance and work ethic.

In discussing citizenship, Marshall fails to discuss how social change affects citizenship rights. Mann and Turner adapt his theory to account for some historicity and contingence behind rights.

Mann stated that citizenship is used as an instrument by the ruling class to control the disruptive impact of the rise of the bourgeoisie and the development of the working class. The ruling class concedes civil, political and social rights to the dangerous classes so as to ensure social order and stability.

Turner emphasised the role of ethnicity in analysing citizenship. In many developed countries, such as the UK and the US, the states institute immigration policies that discriminate against ‘black’ countries (such as India and African countries), favouring citizens from ‘white’ countries as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Turner also suggested that social movements within civil society were important in shaping citizenship – correcting the overstress placed on the state in determining the nature of rights in Marshall’s account.

There are several criticisms of Marshall’s theory and its adaptations. These criticisms focus on how citizenship must be understood in the context of state – civil society relationship, and the factors affecting that relationship.

First, Marshall fails to explain why citizenship expands and contracts over time; in other words, Marshall does not adequately explain how rights increase or decrease in certain societies. To be sure, rights are contingent upon social changes and dynamics of state – civil society relationship that affect the nature of rights; such factors would include class, ethnicity, gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, social movements, and so on. Contrary to Marshall’s evolutionary theory, citizenship does not develop in a universal way, but is historical and contingent.

Second, Marshall’s liberal theory fails to recognise the tensions that exist between the different types of rights – these rights are not complementary, but conflictual. The rights have different logics:

• civil rights are civil society’s rights against the state;
• political rights consist of degrees of control over the state; and
• social rights are claims from the state.

In a framework of welfare-democracy-capitalism, how can these conflictual rights be managed? how can the potential conflicts be overcome? Tensions exist as the civil society makes demands from and aims to control the state.

Third, adaptations of Marshall’s theory neglect to explain how economic factors shape citizenship. During an economic crisis, social rights are reduced as taxes are cut and public spending axed. The poor and the needy are unable to protect themselves against the onslaught of the ruling class as social security is contracted.

Fourth, liberal theory cannot explain how citizenship is transformed in the context of various crises. For instance:

• In a military crisis (e.g., a war), some civil rights can be restricted as the state imposes a curfew, yet sometimes rights can be expanded as previously disadvantaged groups are rewarded as when women were granted greater political rights after the First and Second World Wars.
• In an economic crisis (e.g., recession), some social rights are rolled back as the state is unable to provide an extensive range of social protection, and more emphasis is placed on self-responsibility, the family and community care (i.e., the voluntary sector).
• In an ecological crisis (e.g., depletion of resources), some civil and social rights must be withdrawn, and obligations extended to ensure the ecological survival and stability.

Etzioni identifies several dangers with the liberal theory of citizenship:

• there is no real theory of political obligation to discuss issues such as a sense of duty or loyalty to community;
• while the liberal theory emphasises rights, it ignores responsibilities – indeed, critics argue that the state is overburden by claims of rights;
• the liberal theory implies a moral vacuum as individuals pursue their own interests at the expense of shared values and belongingness to associations of civil society; and
• the liberal theory lacks any understanding of the social formation of the individual, and neglects the social, such that the individuals become increasingly asocial, alienated and dysfunctional as the family life breaks down and community ties disintegrate.

Etzioni suggests ways to reform the liberal society:

• the government should withdraw from the private and voluntary sphere so as to encourage self-responsibility, mutual obligations and greater family and communal commitments;
• the government should especially encourage the family life as this institution is the bedrock of the individual’s self-understanding, values and obligations to society;
• there should be a greater moral dialogue to discuss issues of responsibilities and commitments – political dialogues tend to stress interests and rights.

However, there are serious problems facing the communitarian theory as it underestimates the importance of economic, material dimensions to social problems, the elite nature of institutions in favouring some groups over others, and the success of minority rights.

• Problems facing society (such as family breakdown, increasing crime and social deviance) have both cultural and economic causes, such that, say, unemployment, insecure work and destruction of traditional work communities can result in social problems in the home and the community.
• Institutions (such as the state, the market and clubs and associations) privilege some groups (such as white, middle class males) over others, such that privilege groups can naturalise and legitimise their rights, interests, obligations, responsibilities and commitments, and unfairly discriminate against minority interests that require greater assistance.
• Contrary to Etzioni, minority groups do not enjoy substantive rights, and the political dialogue of rights has not outlived its usefulness. For instance, while blacks and women have formal rights, they lack concrete rights such that ethnic and women social movements must engage in the public sphere.