We shall discuss elite theories on the state – civil society relationship. Then, we shall explore how Weber’s account of the state and civil society differs from Marx’s. Finally, we shall briefly consider the works of neo-Weberians.

Elite theorists strongly reject both Marxists and liberal prescriptions for the state-civil society relationship. Intrinsic to both theories is a threatening egalitarian logic that flies in the face of historical reality. The question of who governs is a simple one to answer: the state is controlled by those individuals who possess a disproportionate amount of the resources necessary to the process of rule. The state and civil society are characterised by an inevitable division of power between elites and the masses.

Classical elite theorists dismiss the notion of popular sovereignty, but they differ on their view for elite rule. Mosca denies that the elites are necessarily morally or even intellectually superior, and sees organisational skill as the key to elite rule. Pareto regards the superiority of the elite in terms of the psychological and personal attributes suitable for government. For Pareto, an elite becomes vulnerable to being overthrown when it becomes ‘softer, milder, more humane and less able to defend its own interests’. Pareto’s theory of elite change, which he calls the circulation of elites, rests upon inevitable degeneration in the qualities of the elite. However, the elite is always renewed by superior individuals, who emerge from the ranks of the masses through force of will.

Pareto identifies two kinds of elites: those who are superior in political astuteness and cunning (foxes) and those who possess high levels of courage and military leadership (lions). Throughout the history of the state, one of these elites, or various combinations of the two, govern, depending upon the needs of the time. Thus, Pareto takes a functional view of the role of the elites in that while elites may change, the basic structure of society does not, thus maintaining social equilibrium.

A key element in elite rule is persuasion and manipulation through the use of communicative power. The ruling class tries to legitimise its control through the creation of a political formula that appears to fit the prevailing historical circumstances. For instance, divine right of kings during the feudal times. The concept of political formula has notion similarities with the Marxist notion of hegemony, but differs from this concept in that it is unconnected to the economic structure of society.

Another version of political formula is representative democracy. Mosca sees representation as a mechanism for social stability – the concerns of the masses come to have influence on the elite, thus avoiding a violent revolution of one elite by another.

Classical elite theory re-affirms the Marxist emphasis upon sectional interest (i.e. elites) in determining the distribution of power in the state and civil society. The theory appears to offer a realistic account of the existing actual power relations in that elites have undoubtedly been important players in the way in which the institutions of state and civil society have been constructed. Elites have institutionalised their influence through the state, and resisted radical democratisation for reasons that cannot be reduced to economic interests alone (as in the Marxist account). Elite theory also challenges radical democrats by arguing that elites cannot be dispensed with and pure democratic self-determination by all individuals is neither possible nor desirable.

However, Pareto and Mosca fail to provide sufficient evidence for how or why different political formulas are adopted or become redundant. Second, the elitists are not strong in their account of changes in elites. Pareto ignores the importance of class struggle and revolution in explaining change. Mosca’s idea of the emergence of new elites from within civil society is incompatible with his low opinion of the masses. Third, elitists fail to explain the relationship between different kinds of power, and in particular the link between politics and economics is left largely unexplored.

Weber and Schumpeter accept that the realist approach of Mosca and see elite leadership as inevitable. Elite rule is also desirable, as a barrier to the excesses of the ignorant masses. However, to ensure social stability, elite leadership has to be linked to the people through democratic mechanisms.

Schumpeter offers an interesting account of how democracy could be made compatible with the reality of elite rule. First, political rule is always exercised by a minority, and that in complex societies participatory democracy, where the masses play a direct and constant role in decision making, is impossible. There is no one dominant elite in liberal society, but instead there exists a dynamic relationship between organised minorities, who each struggle, through non-violent means, to achieve supremacy. Second, democracy is seen, not as an end in itself, but as a method by which elites can be selected by the masses, this ensuring an orderly circulation of elites.

However, there are some weaknesses with this approach. First, Schumpeter and Weber have a impoverished view of democracy: elites are deemed necessary because of the irrationality, apathy and ignorance of the masses, and democracy is perceived as little more than a cynical exercise in the legitimation of inequality. The problem with this model of elite democracy is that it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. In addition, it ignores how elites deter participation and encourage apathy among the masses.

Second, such a cynical theory runs the risk of alienating the majority from the government of their own lives, and this may threaten the stability of the system. Instead, democracy can be viewed more positively, as an ongoing and dynamic process. Any society that claims to be a democracy needs to be conscious of its own limits, and should strive to extend participation. An example of this is the lack of participation by ethnic minorities and women. To argue that such groups are ‘unfit’ to vote sanctions gender and sexual discrimination. And this is the central weakness of elite theory: its tendency to assume that inequalities of power (i.e., elites and masses, men and women, whites and blacks, and so on) are evidence of the strength, rather than weakness, of a political system. These inequalities are not reflections of the unequal distribution of those personal, moral, organisational, psychological or social attributes suitable for government. They are due to structural inequalities such as class, gender and ethnicity.

Weber is antithesis to Marx.

• the role of ideas and ideals (i.e., idealism – not the material conditions of society);
• the rationalisation of society – industrialisation more significant than capitalism;
• the administration of politics is crucial, not the class-based politics; and
• the role of individuals, in particular charismatic leaders, is significant – less emphasis on class structures.

Western and modern life marked by professionalism and routine activities. Life is subject to common forms of assessment and calculability so as to achieve technical efficiency. For example, bureaucracy; while it achieves technical advantages, it alienates individuals as they are unable to control institutions and therefore their own lives. Common evaluators include price, cost and output.

Despite their alienation, individuals can choose to commit themselves to particular values; e.g., status groups.

Weber offers a more developed account of politics: the administration and the state. Whereas for Marx, the mode of production is central to modern societies, for Weber it is the type of authority. Both these accounts offer a different explanation of alienation and its solution. For Marx, revolution is inevitable, whereas for Weber, there is no teleological purpose – only the iron cage of rationality.

The state is the ultimate authority, and is defined as the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.’ This definition of the state has a significant problem. Weber acknowledges the centrality of physical force to the state. However, if the state is legitimate, why do some citizens have to be coerced? This contradiction means that the claim to a monopoly of legitimate physical force can never be made successfully, and in fact that state has often been threatened by the terrorist acts of discontented citizens.

Weber outlined some features of the state:

i) state bureaucracy – bureaucracy is the organisation and administration of the state

ii) groups of officials – lawyers represent a powerful group in society, not the capitalists.

Yet, the state is a threat to democratic society:

• rational norms – emphasis on efficiency and calculability at the expense of justice and equality;
• state power – centralisation of power; individuals are unable to challenge the state.

There are other key characteristics of the modern state:

i) impersonal rule: the rule of law constrains the power of any single position of office or state body – the creation of rational-legal framework of power broke with traditions of absolutist states where power was largely personalised;

ii) legitimate authority: the recognition of state authority by its citizens, who have a reciprocal relationship with the state; e.g., taxes for guarantee of basic civil rights;

iii) sovereignty: the state recognises no equal power within its defined territorial boundaries, and all those individuals who live within these borders are obliged to obey its law;

iv) violence: the state asserts the right to inflict violence upon its citizens, it is claimed as a rational necessity to maintain social order – though this characteristics sits uneasily alongside the notion of legitimate authority;

v) integration and exclusion: the state defines those citizens who can belong to the state and those who cannot; and

vi) differentiation: many of the state functions are divided into distinct bodies: welfare state, police, court system, and so on.

Power of great persons, charisma and leadership. This belief puts Weber into the elite theory school of thought.

However, this is not an either/or matter: both bureaucracy and leaders matter.

A major question for social scientists is ‘How do individuals integrate?’ Whereas Marx emphasises ideology, Weber points to authority, in particular its rational-legal foundations. This type of authority is universal and impersonal; is efficient for large-scale societies; facilities democratic rule; and is a contract between the state and its citizens.

Yet, the authority requires an administrative apparatus to help implement the law, to enforce obedience.

Whereas Marx emphasises social classes, Weber points to status groups and political parties. These social groups compete to influence the state:

i) status groups – shared occupations, lifestyles and values; and

ii) political parties – political associations to achieve political power only

Social classes are too broad to achieve mobilisation of resources.

By examining European states, Tilly et al. provide some ideas about the modern state

i) a clear and coherent definition of the modern state;

ii) not only examined why the nation-state emerged, but why its alternatives (such as the city-state) failed;

iii) state-making was war-making – successful in war tended towards the development of the modern state; and

iv) there is no sequence or stages of state-making.

Two central factors to the modern state:

• concentration and accumulation of capital; and
• concentration and accumulation of coercion and force.

Different modern states arose from different combination of capital and coercion. For example, the Dutch state arose largely due to the urban industry and financiers, whereas the German state from the military and administrative forces.

Tilly moves away from the grand paradigms of Marx and class, and Weber and charismatic leadership and ideology. Instead:

i) Mobilisation model of collective action – this model has four elements:

• interests – particular groups;
• organisation – structures to promote particular groups;
• mobilisation – resources to seek advantages; and
• opportunity – chances to battle against established order.

ii) Repertoire of collective action – specific kinds of protests and discontent emerge among people in a historical epoch. For instance, local and patronised actions were common in C17th France, changing to national and autonomous actions of C20th and C21th.

Collective action is not a major revolutionary event; but a host of different populations, each engaged in different kinds of struggles. Success depends on large causes (i.e., opportunities) as well as strategic aims of actors.

a) State and revolution – state influences the course of revolution.

b) US welfare state – historical and institutional context matters for the late development of the welfare state:

• a lack of centralised status apparatus;
• elites and middle classes failed to act to promote the welfare state; and
• the emergence of a strong maternalist state.